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Abstract
We consider a signalling game in which a population of receivers
decide on the outcome by majority rule, sender and receivers have con-
flicting interests, and there is uncertainty about both players’ types.
We model players rationality along the lines of recent findings in be-
havioral game theory. We characterize the structure of the equilibria
in the reduced game so obtained. We find that all pure strategy equi-
libria are consistent with successful attempts to mislead the receivers,
and relate them to the message bin Laden sent on the eve of the 2004
US Presidential elections. The same result holds if we allow for some
uncertainty about the sign of the correlation between the sender’s and
the receivers’ payoffs.
1 Introduction
The weekend before 2004 US presidential elections the Al-Jazeera TV net-
work aired a videotaped address from Osama bin Laden (OBL henceforth)
whose content reached also American people. Apparently the message was
not about the impending elections: 1
People of America this talk of mine is for you and concerns
the ideal way to prevent another Manhattan, and deals with the
war and its causes and results.
1A full transcript of the speech can be found on the following web-
site http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/79C6AF22-98FB-4A1C-B21F-
2BC36E87F61F.htm
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The timing of the message and its very ending though, leave little doubts
about the fact that it was indeed meant to influence the American voters.
Quoting again from the message:
[...] The wise man doesn’t squander his security, wealth and
children for the sake of the liar in the White House. In conclu-
sion, I tell you in truth, that your security is not in the hands
of Kerry, nor Bush, nor al-Qaida. No. Your security is in your
own hands.
It is clearly not an easy task to ascertain whether or not the message
had a significant impact on the vote. However, several commentators agreed
on the conclusion that the message actually helped re-electing George W.
Bush. 2 For example, quoting from Krauthammer [8]:
With the election hanging in the balance, the campaign awaited
some improbable development to tip the scale. Re-enter OBL.
By reminding us 9/11 and the war on terrorism, OBL invoked
the only thing that could trump Iraq - and save the President.
His chilling reappearance reminded us of our peril, put Iraq in
perspective and played precisely to the President’s success and
strength - success and strength that he so squandered in Bagh-
dad. Bin Laden was never one to remotely understand the Amer-
ican mind. He spectacularly misjudged 9/11 - and he pulled his
nemesis over the finish line.
In an experimental setting (conducted in late September 2004), Cohen et
al. [4] show that shifting the public’s attention onto themes such as terrorism
and the recollection of the facts of 9/11 would tend to substantially shift
votes from Kerry to Bush. We take this result as evidence that OBL’s sortie
in the closing days of the campaign might have had a significant impact
on vote, helping President Bush’s re-election, and formulate the following
working hypothesis: the message was indeed targeting the U.S. voters and
had an effect in the outcome of the presidential elections. In other words,
we stick to the interpretation that the face value of OBL’s words boils down
to opposing George W. Bush and hence “endorsing” John F. Kerry, and
that voters definitely responded to those words. We then propose a model
2The defeated candidate himself later ascribed a decisive importance to the videotape
for the presidential race. Senator Kerry indeed said that (See Nagourney [11]) “... the
attacks of Sept. 11 were the “central deciding thing” in his contest with President Bush
and that the release of an OBL videotape the weekend before Election Day had effectively
erased any hope he had of victory.”
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that deals with the strategic rationale of this message and its ultimate effect
on the polls. We want to understand the following issues: did OBL really
misunderstand the American voters? Was his implied stand on U.S. election
(opposing Bush / endorsing Kerry) a lie or a truthful revelation of his view?
Did the American voters believe him? OBL’s message is an example of an
attempt to influence the result of an election by a third-party using a costless
message. The number of cases in which third parties endorse (more or less
explicitly) one candidate is surely large. An example is the Economist’s
strong position against Mr. Berlusconi’s fitness to lead Italy before both
the 2001 and the 2006 Italian general elections. Another is sub-commander
Marcos’ “endorsement”, on national television in May 2006, of one of the
candidates for the incoming Presidential elections in Mexico. Nevertheless,
OBL’s role and his message’s timing, content and echo in the media, make
it a rather novel event in the political scenery. We think it is interesting
to understand why such an announcement was publicly made, and how the
American voters reacted to it through the vote.
To this end, we consider a game a` la Crawford and Sobel [6], played
between one sender and a population of receivers. The sender has private
information about a state variable while the receivers take a binary action
upon observing a public message from the sender. Majority rule determines
the choice implemented, which, together with the prevailing state, deter-
mines the payoffs. Players have opposite interests. Under this setup in any
equilibrium the sender uses only uninformative messages, and the receivers
choose the action that, ex ante, maximizes their expected payoff. This being
the case, OBL’s message could not have shifted votes in favor of Bush. To
account for this possibility, we introduce a structural model of interaction
between fully and behaviorally rational players that resembles Crawford [5]
analysis of Allies’ successful attempt to mislead the Germans about where
they would land on D-Day in 1944. In this setup, both receivers and sender
are uncertain about the degree of sophistication of their opponent. The
equilibria of this incomplete information game are studied as a function of
the parameters governing this uncertainty.
The strategic interaction between OBL and the U.S. voters we have in
mind can be explained by the following example: the state of the world rep-
resents the exogenous seriousness of OBL’s imminent threat to U.S. national
security. In particular, we may think of it as OBL’s “health” condition in
relation to his (and al-Qaida’s) ability to plan and carry out another strike
relatively quickly. 3 In a “low” state, OBL is capable of organizing another
3Ample speculation about the state of OBL’s kidney disorder has been publicly made.
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attack within few months after the election, and the U.S. voters prefer an
aggressive foreign policy. Therefore they see Bush as the better option. In a
“high” state, OBL’s health represents a serious threat to his ability to orga-
nize a new strike, and the U.S. citizens prefer a foreign policy more inclined
towards diplomacy, that would probably cost them less. In this case they
see Kerry as a better alternative.
As for OBL, we make the assumption that his payoffs are in sharp con-
trast with the U.S. citizens. In particular, in a “high” state he prefers Bush,
because this option is more likely to turn him into a martyr. Conversely,
in a “low” state, OBL prefers Kerry because the time of diplomacy may be
long enough to allow him (and al-Qaida) to prepare for future terroristic
activities.
We want to stress that at the time of the message, candidates positions
were spelled out clearly and no time for changes was available. In other
words, positions on foreign policy issues were given to the voters. In this
respect, we believe it is a sensible assumption to focus on the game between
OBL and the U.S. voters.
The type of uncertainty is modeled along the lines of Crawford [5], as this
approach seems quite natural given the idiosyncratic nature of the events.
In fact, unlike similar applications of strategic information transmission,
such as Sobel [13] and Benabou and Laroque [1], the novelty of the scenario
does not leave room for learning or reputation considerations. The same
lack of repetition cannot even allow for a test of equilibrium play in mixed
strategies. 4 Therefore we assume that players are characterized by their
expectations about how the others will play, and choose their best plan of
action accordingly. The class of expectations we consider has been shown
to be a well-grounded starting point for interpreting how people react to
novel situations. Examples include first-round behavior in experimental
guessing games, as in Nagel [10] and estimated types in a series of two-
person normal-form games in Costa-Gomes et al. [9]. The related model of
cognitive hierarchy developed by Camerer et al. [2] also shows good fit to
empirical data from various experimental games.
Finally, our model relates also to Farrell and Gibbons [7], where the
sender faces two different receivers. We differenciate from them since no re-
ceiver can be excluded from observing the message, and the final outcome is
determined by majority rule, so that, in particular, the sender’s payoff is not
additively separable in the actions of different groups within the population
4This approach can be used for sports, were data can be (and in fact are) gathered.
See for example Chiappori et al. [3], Palacios-Huerta [12] and Walker and Wooders [14].
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P2
P1
I(U) = 1 b,−b
I(U) = 0 0, 0
S1
P2
P1
I(U) = 1 0, 0
I(U) = 0 1,−1
S2
Figure 1: Payoffs given P2’s action and the state of nature, with b > 0.
of receivers. Majority rule per se does not change the outcome with respect
to the one receiver’s case. It’s the addition of uncertainty about players’
degree of sophistication that makes our model, we believe, interesting.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2, discusses
the model in its general form. Section 3 extends the model to account
for uncertainty about the payoffs correlation between sender and receiver.
Section 4 concludes.
2 The model
Suppose there are two states of the world, {S1, S2} = S, whose proba-
bilities are, respectively, p and 1−p. There are two sets of players, a sender,
P1, who knows the state of the world, and a population (continuum) of
receivers, P2, who do not know it. P1 sends a message m ∈M = {m1,m2}
to P2, which in turn chooses an action a ∈ A = {U,D}. Let I(U) be the in-
dicator function that takes value 1 (resp. 0) if the fraction of receivers that
choose action U is larger (resp. smaller) than 1/2. The payoffs for both
players depend on the state of nature and on the action of the receivers and
are reported in figure 1, where the parameter b > 0.
A (pure) strategy for the sender is a function from the state of the world
space (S) to the message space (M). A (pure) strategy for the receivers is
a function from the message space (M) to the action space (A). (m1,m2)
denotes the pure strategy that corresponds to sending message m1 if the
state is S1 and sending the message m2 if the state is S2. (U,D) denotes the
strategy that corresponds to choosing action U if message is m1 and action
D if message is m2.
In the remainder of this section we describe first the equilibria of the
game with rational players (which represents the benchmark case), as a
function of the parameters p and b, and then focus on the equilibria of the
5
reduced game where some uncertainty about types of players is introduced
along the lines of Crawford [5]. Attention will be restricted to the cases
when pb = 1 − p which resembles a close election, one that, probably, best
resembles the 2004 Presidential election. 5
One final remark before we proceed with the analysis: in the sub-game of
the vote between receivers, we restrict attention to symmetric un-dominated
strategies, which basically means that receivers choose the action that max-
imizes their expected payoff were they pivotal to the election and that they
mix with the same probability when indifferent.
If the game is played by standard players, then we know that in equi-
librium no message can reveal any extra information. As a result, receivers
choose an action so as to maximize expected payoffs given the prior proba-
bilities on the states of nature.
Lemma 1 Suppose the players are rational and pb = 1− p: then the Nash
equilibria of the game are described by
[α1(m1,m1) + α2(m1,m2) + α2(m2,m1) + α4(m2,m2)]
[β1(U,U) + β2(U,D) + β2(D,U) + β4(D,D)]
with αi ≥ 0, α1 + 2α2 + α4 = 1, and βi ≥ 0, β1 + 2β2 + β4 = 1
where the first row reads: P1 mixes among (U,U), (U,D), (D,U), and
(D,D) with probability α1, α2, α2, and α4. The second row reads in a
similar fashion. 6
If the game is played by standard players, then in equilibrium messages
will reveal no information, which otherwise can be exploited by P2. No
prediction regarding the outcome can then be based on the model when
pb = 1− p and the players are fully rational. If one takes the claim that the
message had effects seriously, as we do, then an enlarged model is needed.
Therefore we introduce a structural model of uncertainty about types of
players that draws from behavioral economics. Players are unsure about
the degree of rationality of their opponents. They only know that they can
belong to the family of either mortal or sophisticated players. Mortal players’
5We believe this to be the more interesting case since it is the one where information to
the receiver may have an impact on her decision. In a previous draft, we also considered
the case where pb > 1− p.
6For the class of equilibria where P1 sends only one message, a specification of P2’s
beliefs for off equilibrium messages would complete the description of the equilibria. We
just skip this part as those equilibria do not arise in the reduced game we are about to
analyze.
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strategies are determined by iteration of best responses, starting from a
naive definition of types of senders. In particular, we assume that some
senders always choose (m1,m2). We call them truth-tellers. Some receivers
believe that senders are only truth-tellers and therefore optimally choose
(U,D). These receivers are called believers. Some other senders (which we
call liars) think the population of receivers is made only of believers, and
therefore optimally choose (m2,m1). Last, some receivers (which we call
inverters) believe the senders are all liars, and therefore optimally choose
(D,U). Note that we could increase the level of sophistication of the players
arbitrarily, but after the last iteration we would end up with types of mortal
players whose behavior is identical to those just introduced. Therefore there
is no loss in generality in considering only the two pairs of mortal types:
truth-tellers believers, and liars inverters.
Let xt, xl, and xs denote the probability a sender is, respectively, a
truth-teller, a liar, or a sophisticated type. Similarly, yb, yi, and ys de-
note, the population’s share of believers, inverters and sophisticated types.
Sophisticated players are the standard rational players, and their behavior
comes from equilibrium considerations, given that the structure of the game
(payoffs, strategy and uncertainty about types) is common knowledge.
Lemma 2 The sophisticated receiver’s best response is given by
(U,D) if xs(1 + w1 − w2) > 1− 2xt
(D,U) if xs(1 + w1 − w2) < 1− 2xt
Proof. A (pivotal) sophisticated receiver will choose the action max-
imizing expected payoff. Upon observing message m1, the probability of
being in state S1 and S2 is proportional to, respectively, p(xt + w1xs) and
(1− p)(xl + w2xs). Therefore, since pb = 1− p U is optimal under m1 if
xt + w1xs > xl + w2xs,
i.e. if
xs(1 + w1 − w2) > 1− 2xt.
Similarly, upon observing message m2, the probability of being in state S1
and S2 is proportional to, respectively, xl + (1−w1)xs and xt + (1−w2)xs.
Therefore U is optimal under m2 if
xl + (1− w1)xs > xt + (1− w2)xs,
i.e. if
1− 2xt > (1 + w1 − w2)xs.
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Therefore the only pure strategy best responses for the sophisticated re-
ceiver are (U,D) or (D,U). Let β denote the probability of the sophisticated
receiver playing (U,D) and 1− β the probability of playing (D,U).
Lemma 3 the sophisticated sender’s best response to β(U,D)+(1−β)(D,U)
is given by
(m1,m2) if βys <
1
2
− yb
(m2,m1) if βys >
1
2
− yb
Proof. The sophisticated sender is facing a distribution of strategies given
by
(yb + βys)(U,D) + (yi + (1− β)ys)(D,U). (1)
Thus, in state S1, message m1 is best if
yb + βys < 12 < yi + (1− β)ys, (2)
while m2 is best if
yi + (1− β)ys < 12 < yb + βys. (3)
Last, indifference between m1 and m2 is obtained whenever neither (2)
nor (3) hold. Now observe that
• yb + βys + yi + (1− β)ys = 1;
• In state S2 message mi is best whenever in state S1 m3−i is best.
Therefore the only possible configurations are (m1,m2) and (m2,m1), and
the former holds whenever
yb + βys <
1
2
,
while the latter holds whenever the opposite (strict) inequality holds.
We are now in the position to characterize the pure strategy (sequential)
Nash equilibria of the game, under the assumption that the sender is a
sophisticated player.
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Proposition 1 The structure of the pure strategies (sequential) Nash equi-
libria in weekly dominant strategies is described in the following:
EQ1 : [(m1,m2), (U,D)] if and only if yi > 12 and xl <
1
2
EQ2 : [(m2,m1), (U,D)] if and only if yi < 12 and xt >
1
2
EQ3 : [(m1,m2), (D,U)] if and only if yb < 12 and xl >
1
2
EQ4 : [(m2,m1), (D,U)] if and only if yb > 12 and xt <
1
2
Further, for the sophisticated sender, all the above equilibria imply that, with
majority rule, the outcome favorable to the sender will result, whatever the
state.
Proposition 1 shows that the (sophisticated) sender can always take ad-
vantage of the uncertainty, whether it is about the receivers or about himself.
In fact, whenever the population share of one mortal player is larger than
1/2 the sophisticated sender can just induce the most preferred outcome
by fooling the majority of mortal players. On the other hand, when the
probability that the sender is either mortal player is larger than 1/2, the
sophisticated sender can just mimic the strategy of the least likely mortal
and then fool even the sophisticated receivers, who nevertheless are acting
optimally. Observe that if instead the sender is mortal then the outcome
will favor a liar in EQ2 and EQ3 and it will favor the receivers in EQ2 and
EQ4. The situation is reversed if the sender is a truth-teller.
Thus our framework offers a simple way to assess, for example, whether
the final comment in Krauthammer [8] that OBL actually played against
himself through his message is actually realistic. The argument we can give
is based on the plausibility of the implied restrictions on the parameters
that describe the ex-ante probabilities regarding the types. Indeed, without
attaching any specific interpretation to states and actions, the pure-strategy
equilibria we obtain all entail that voters are fooled by a sophisticated sender
whatever the state. Whether such conclusion has a sort of “conspiracy
theory” flavor we leave it the reader to decide.
It remains to consider the case where 12 > max {xt, xl, yb, yi}. The equi-
librium is in mixed strategy, as a quick glance at the best responses’ functions
suggests. (Figures 2 and 3 report the best responses for, respectively, P1
and P2 as a function of the parameters governing the uncertainty about
players’ types.) Let α1, α2, α3, and α4 denote the probability of, re-
spectively, (m1,m1), (m1,m2), (m2,m1), and (m2,m2). P2 is indifferent
9
UU Æs2s1
UD Æ s2s1
DU Æ s1s2
UU Æs1s2
UD Æ s2s1
DU Æ s1s2
s2s1 dominant
s1s2 dominant
1=by
1=sy 1=iy
2
1
2
1
Figure 2: Best responses to pure strategies for sophisticated sender in the
reduced game.
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2
1
s1s1ÆDU
s1s2ÆUD
s2s1ÆDU
s2s2ÆDU
UD dominant
1=tx
1=sx 1=lx
DU dominant
s1s1ÆUD
s1s2ÆUD
s2s1ÆDU
s2s2ÆUD
2
1
Figure 3: Best responses to pure strategies for sophisticated receiver in the
reduced game.
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between (U,D) and (D,U) if and only if
2xt + xs(α1 + 2α2 + α4) = 2xl + xs(α1 + 2α3 + α4),
which requires
α2 =
xl − xt
xs
+ α3.
The associated expected payoff will be
2xl + xs(α1 + 2α3 + α4) =
2xl + xs(α1 + α3 + α4 + α3) =
2xl + xs(1− α2 + α3) =
2xl + xs(1− xl − xt
xs
− α3 + α3) =
2xl + xs(1− xl − xt
xs
) =
2xl + xs − xl + xt =1,
which corresponds to the expected payoff of choosing either (U,U) or (D,D).
Thus when P2 is indifferent between (U,D) and (D,U), P2 is indifferent
between any of the strategies available.
Similarly, let β1, β2, β3, and β4 denote, respectively, the probability
of playing (U,U), (U,D), (D,U), and (D,D). P2 is indifferent between
(m1,m2) and (m2,m1) if and only if
2yb + ys(β1 + 2β2 + β4) = 2yi + ys(β1 + 2β3 + β4)
which requires
β2 =
yi − yb
ys
+ β3
The associated expected payoff will be
2yi + ys(β1 + 2β3 + β4) =
2yi + ys(β1 + β3 + β4 + β3) =
2yi + ys(1− β2 + β3) =
2yi + ys(1− yi − yb
ys
− β3 + β3) =
2yi + ys(1− yi − yb
ys
) =
2yi + ys − yi + yb =1,
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which corresponds to the expected payoff of choosing either (m1,m1) or
(m2,m2). Thus when P1 is indifferent between (m1,m2) and (m2,m1), P1
is indifferent between any of the strategies available.
Proposition 2 Assume 12 ≥ max {xt, xl, yi, yb}. The mixed strategies (se-
quential) equilibria are given by
[α1(m1,m1) + α2(m1,m2) + α3(m2,m1) + α4(m2,m2)]
[β1(U,U) + β2(U,D) + β3(D,U) + β4(D,D)]
with α2 =
xl − xt
xs
+ α3, αi ≥ 0 for all i,
∑
i
αi = 1
with β2 =
yi − yb
ys
+ β3, βj ≥ 0 for all j,
∑
j
βj = 1
Observe that α2 R α3 if and only if xl R xt. That is, whenever there are more
liars than truth-tellers, the sophisticated player needs to put higher weight
on (m1,m2) (truth-telling) in the mixed strategies equilibrium. Moreover,
this weight increases with the difference between the measure of these two
types of mortal players. Similarly, β2 R β3 if and only if yi R yb.
Notice also that in all cases there is an ex-ante exact fifty-fifty expected
split of the population between those that choose U and those that choose
D, as a result of the use of the mixed strategy by the sophisticated receivers.
So the outcome of the underlying election is undetermined: it will be the
result of the discrepancy between β and the actual fractions of sophisticated
receivers choosing either alternative (the actual realization of the mixed
strategy over the population). This case resembles somehow the equilibrium
in the full rationality case. In fact, as the probabilities of mortal players go to
zero, this equilibrium converges to the mixed strategy equilibrium under full
rationality. (This is not coincidental, as the Nash equilibria in the reduced
game are continuous in the players’ types’ parameter space.)
To recap, we find that the sophisticated sender can achieve the most pre-
ferred outcome unless the probability of sophisticated players is sufficiently
large. We find this result very interesting especially in relation to the ten-
dency of mass media in shaping the public opinion on the (ir)rationality of
some actors.
In the next section we extend the model to allow for uncertainty about
the correlation between sender’s and receivers’ payoffs.
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P2
P1
I(U) = 1 1,−1
I(U) = 0 0, 0
S1
P1
1, 1
0, 0
S2
P1
0, 0
1, 1
S3
P1
0, 0
1,−1
S4
Figure 4: Player’s payoffs under each state of the world.
3 What if P1may have common interests with P2?
In this section we investigate the case in which P1 may have interests
that, under some states of the world, coincide with those of P2. Assume
therefore that the states of the world are S = {S1, S2, S3, S4}. Let pi be the
probability of state i. P1 can still send two different messages, which now
we label asM = {m1,m2}, and a strategy for P1 is a function from S toM .
P2 choose an action, a ∈ A = {U,D} and a strategy for P2 is a function
from the set of M to A. Let I(U) be the indicator function that takes value
1 (resp. 0) if the fraction of receivers that choose action U is larger (resp.
smaller) than 1/2. Players’ payoffs as a function of the states and of P2’s
actions are reported in figure 4. Compared to the previous model, we have
added uncertainty about the payoffs structure but we have also restricted
attention to the case where both alternatives give the same payoff to both
players. In what follows we will consider the main case where
p1 + p2 = p3 + p4, (4)
which, again, corresponds to a close election. We shall suppose further that
either one of these two inequalities hold
p2 + p3 >p1 + p4 (5)
p2 + p3 <p1 + p4 (6)
Inequality (5) means that P1 is more likely to have positively correlated
payoffs with P2 (we call him a friend), while inequality (6) means P1 is
more likely to have negatively correlated payoffs with P2 (we call him an
enemy). This model is similar to Sobel [13], for there is uncertainty on
whether the sender is a friend or enemy, as well as on which action is best
for the receiver.
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Given the nature of M and S, a strategy for P1 can induce posterior
probabilities on S that generate on of the following partitions of S:
S0 ={S}
S1 ={{Si}, {S−i}}
S2 ={{Si, Sh}, {Sj , Sk}}
S0 corresponds to totally uninformative messages. S1 corresponds to mes-
sages where one state, Si, is revealed with probability 1. S2 corresponds to
messages where where two states, Si and Sh, are separated from the other
two, Sj and Sk.
Definition 1 A partially revealing equilibrium is an equilibrium that in-
duces either S1 or S2. A pooling equilibrium is an equilibrium that induces
S0.
Observe that there cannot be partially revealing equilibria that induce
S1, since P1 has an incentive to deviate from the proposed strategy when
the states are either S1 or S4.
Proposition 3 Suppose condition (5) holds, then there exists an equilib-
rium in which P1 credibly informs P2 of his preferred states.
The above is the analogous to Theorem 1 in Sobel [13], and it says that
if the probability of P1 being a friend is larger than 1/2, then there is
an equilibrium in which the most preferred action for P1 is revealed with
probability 1.
The next sections consider the equilibria of the reduced game among
sophisticated players once types uncertainty is introduced.
3.1 P1 is an enemy
Consider first the case where P1 is an enemy. Conditions (4) and (6)
imply that p4 > p2 and p1 > p3. Consider a baseline type of sender
choosing (m1,m2,m1,m2), which means this type sends the message m1
if s ∈ {S1, S3}, and send the message m2 if s ∈ {S2, S4}. 7 This corresponds
again to a truth-telling type, in the sense that the strategy separates the
states where the sender prefers U to the states where the sender prefers D.
By iterating best responses we have the following types’ pairs:
7Adopting alternative definitions of senders’ mortal behaviors at the first iteration of
the best response results in more calculations without altering the main point of the paper.
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truth-teller (m1,m2,m1,m2) believer (U,D)
liar (m2,m1,m2,m1) inverter (D,U)
where, again, (U,D) means that the receiver chooses action U if message
is m1, and action D if message is m2. Observe that further iterating best
responses would not return different types from those above. Therefore there
is no loss in generality in stopping with the above characterization of types.
Let xt, xl and xs denote the probability of P1’s types. Similarly, yb, yl and
ys denote the population share of P2’s types.
It remains to define the behavior of the sophisticated players. Let wi
denote the probability that the sophisticated P1 sends message m1 in state
Si.
Lemma 4 The sophisticated receiver’s best response is given by
(U,D) if (xt + w1xs)p1 + (xl + w2xs)p2 > (xt + w3xs)p3 + (xl + w4xs)p4
(D,U) if (xt + w1xs)p1 + (xl + w2xs)p2 < (xt + w3xs)p3 + (xl + w4xs)p4
Proof. A (pivotal) sophisticated receiver will choose the action maximizing
expected payoff. Upon observing message m1, the probability of being in
state Si is proportional to (xt + wixs)pi if i ∈ 1, 3 and to (xl + wixs)pi
if i ∈ 2, 4; similarly, the probability of being in state Si conditional to
observing message m2 is proportional to (xl+(1−wi)xs)pi if i ∈ 1, 3 and to
(xt+(1−wi)xs)pi if i ∈ 2, 4. Using these probabilities, it is straightforward
to verify that (U,D) is optimal if and only if (xt+w1xs)p1+(xl+w2xs)p2 >
(xt + w3xs)p3 + (xl + w4xs)p4 while (D,U) is optimal if and only if the
opposite inequality holds.
Let β and 1 − β denote, respectively, the probability a sophisticated
receiver chooses (U,D) and (D,U).
Lemma 5 The best response for a sophisticated P1 is given by:
(m1,m2,m1,m2) if βys <
1
2
− yb
(m2,m1,m2,m1) if βys >
1
2
− yb
Proof. The proof is virtually identical to the proof of lemma 5. Let µ(A|m)
the share of receivers choosing action A after observing message m. We have
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that
µ(D|m1) =yi + (1− β)ys
µ(U |m1) =1− µ(D|m1)
µ(D|m2) =yb + βys
µ(U |m2) =1− µ(D|m2)
Consider first the states {S1, S3}, in which the sender’s preferred outcome
is D. Message m1 is preferred if
µ(D|m1) > 12 > µ(D|m2), (7)
whereas m2 is preferred if
µ(D|m2) > 12 > µ(D|m1). (8)
Last, the sophisticated is indifferent betweenm1 andm2 if neither (7) nor (8)
hold. Observe that µ(D|m1)+µ(D|m2) = 1, which means that conditions (7)
and (8) can be simplified to, respectively, µ(D|m1) > 12 and µ(D|m1) < 12 .
Now consider the states {S2, S4}, in which the sender’s preferred outcome
is U . Message m1 is preferred if
µ(U |m1) > 12 > µ(U |m2), (9)
whereas m2 is preferred if
µ(U |m2) > 12 > µ(U |m1). (10)
Last, the sophisticated is indifferent between m1 and m2 if neither (9)
nor (10) hold. Observe that µ(U |m1) + µ(U |m2) = 1, which means that
conditions (9) and (10) can be simplified to, respectively, µ(U |m1) > 12 and
µ(U |m1) < 12 .
By inspecting these conditions, it can be seen that m1 is optimal in
{S1, S3} if and only if m2 is optimal in {S2, S4}. Thus the only pos-
sible configurations in pure strategies for the sophisticated P1 are either
(m1,m2,m1,m2) or (m2,m1,m2,m1). The former works when µ(D|m1)12 ,
i.e. when
yi + (1− β)ys > 12 ,
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UU Æ m2m1m2m1
UD Æ m2m1m2m1
DU Æ m1m2m1m2
DD Æ m2m1m2m1
m1m2m1m2 dominant
1=by
1=sy 1=iy
2
1
2
1
m2m1m2m1 dominant
UU Æ m1m2m1m2
UD Æ m2m1m2m1
DU Æ m1m2m1m2
DD Æ m1m2m1m2
Figure 5: Best responses to pure strategies for sophisticated sender in the
reduced game.
which holds if and only if
βys <
1
2
− yb.
This allows us to characterize P1’s best response to any pure strategy
from P2. Results similar to those in the base game arise. (See figure (5).)
In particular, for (m1,m2,m1,m2) (resp. (m2,m1,m2,m1)) to be a
dominant strategy yi > 12 (resp. yb >
1
2) is needed. Therefore, no dom-
inant strategy exists when 12 > max{yi, yb}, but the best response is either
(m1,m2,m1,m2) or (m2,m1,m2,m1).
Consider now P2. Let α, 1−α denote the probability that sophisticated
P1 chooses, respectively, (m1,m2,m1,m2) and (m2,m1,m2,m1).
We are now in the position to characterize the pure strategy (sequential)
Nash equilibria of the game.
Proposition 4 Suppose conditions (4) and (6) hold. Then the pure strategy
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(sequential) Nash equilibria of the reduced game between sophisticated sender
and receivers are given by
EQ1 : [(m1,m2,m1,m2), (U,D)] if and only if yi > 12 and xl <
1
2
EQ2 : [(m1,m2,m1,m2), (D,U)] if and only if yb < 12 and xl >
1
2
EQ3 : [(m2,m1,m2,m1), (U,D)] if and only if yi < 12 and xt >
1
2
EQ4 : [(m2,m1,m2,m1), (D,U)] if and only if yb > 12 and xt <
1
2
Further, for the sophisticated sender, all the above equilibria imply that, with
majority rule, the outcome favorable to the sender will result, whatever the
state.
Note that the equilibria correspond exactly to those in the initial case.
Consider first the cases where one mortal receiver represents the majority of
the population. In this case the sophisticated sender can take advantage of
them and fool the majority of voters. (Equilibria 1 and 4). Now consider the
case when the sophisticated receiver is pivotal. Since there is a probability
larger than 1/2 of a mortal receiver, the sophisticated receiver will mimic the
behavior of the other mortal and then fool the sophisticated receivers. Thus
the logic is exactly the same as in the previous case. The only difference
is that it is not true anymore that the receivers loose anytime the most
preferred outcome of the sender is implemented. In particular, in states S2
and S3, letting the sophisticated sender determine the outcome helps the
receivers as well.
It remains to find the equilibria in mixed strategies. Remember that
these equilibria arise whenever 12 > max {xt, xl, yb, yi}. Let αi denote the
probability the sophisticated sender chooses message m1 in state Si. Let βi
denote the probability the sophisticated receiver chooses action U if mes-
sage mi is received. Therefore the conditions for indifference among all the
possible strategies for P1 and P2 are given by, respectively
xs(p3α3 + p4α4 − p1α1 − p2α2) = (p3 − p1)(xt − xl)
ys(β2 − β1) = yb − yi
The role of the sophisticated players in the mixed strategies equilibrium is
the same as in the standard model: they need to put more probability on
choosing the action that is consistent with the mortal type whose probability
is smaller. Moreover, we can see that the mixed strategy for the sophisti-
cated receiver is the same as in the standard model, since the receiver only
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needs to condition the action to the message received. For the sophisticated
sender there are more options available, but the nature of the mixed strategy
equilibrium is the same as in the standard model.
An example of a possible mixed strategy equilibrium is given by
Proposition 5 Let conditions (4) and (6) hold. Assume 12 > max {xt, xl, yb, yi}.
The following pair of strategies is a mixed strategy equilibrium
[α(m1,m2,m1,m2) + (1− α)(m2,m1,m2,m1)] α = 12 +
xl − xt
2xs
[β(U,D) + (1− β)(D,U)] β = 1
2
+
yb − yi
2ys
where β denotes the probability of (U,D), and α denotes the probability of
(m1,m2,m1,m2).
Proof. P1 is indifferent between the two strategies if and only if
(p2+p3)[yi+(1−β)ys]−(p1+p4)[yb+uys] = (p2+p3)[yb+uys]−(p1+p4)[yi+(1−β)ys]
yi + (1− β)ys = yb + uys
yi + ys − yb = 2uys
β =
1
2
+
yi − yb
2ys
Observe first that β is well defined, since 12 > max {yb, yi}. Moreover, that
value of β makes the sender indifferent between any of the strategies avail-
able. In fact, by sending message m1 the probability of P2 playing U is
yb+ uys = 12 . Similarly, by sending message m2, the probability of P2 play-
ing U is yi+(1−β)ys = 12 . Therefore, none of P1’s pure strategies can make
him better off than mixing between (m1,m2,m1,m2) and (m2,m1,m2,m1).
Similarly, P2 is indifferent between (U,D) and (D,U) if and only if
(p1+p4)[(1−α)xs+xl]+(p2+p3)[wxs+xt] = (p1+p4)[wxs+xt]+(p2+p3)[(1−α)xs+xl]
(p1 + p4 − p2 − p3)[(1− α)xs + xl − wxs − xt] = 0
(1− α)xs + xl − wxs − xt = 0
xs + xl − xt = 2wxs
α =
1
2
+
xl − xt
2xs
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Observe first that α is well defined since 12 > max {xt, xl}. Moreover, that
value of α makes the receiver indifferent between any of the strategies avail-
able. In fact, (1− α)xs + xl = 12 = wxs + xt, so that the expected payoff of
either (U,D) or (D,U) is 12 which is also what P2 can guarantee himself by
choosing either (D,D) or (U,U).
Therefore we can conclude that the introduction of uncertainty about
correlation in payoffs between sender and receiver does not change the main
result if there is at least a 50 % chance that the sender is indeed an enemy.
We now turn to the opposite case, that is when the sender is more likely to
be a friend, which we analyze in the next section.
3.2 P1 is a friend
Consider now the case where P1 is a friend (i.e. when (5) holds.) This
means that p2 > p4, and p3 > p1. If we assume again that the most naive
sender adopts (m1,m2,m1,m2), iteration of best responses generates the
following set of distinct pairs of players’ types:
truth-teller : (m1,m2,m1,m2) believer (D,U)
As before, let wi denote the probability the sophisticated sender chooses
m1 in state Si.
Lemma 6 Let conditions (4) and (5) hold. The sophisticated sender’s best
response is given by
(U,D) if (p3 − p1)xt < xs(p1w1 + p2w2 − p3w3 − p4w4)
(D,U) if (p3 − p1)xt > xs(p1w1 + p2w2 − p3w3 − p4w4)
The proof is identical to the one for lemma 4 and therefore is omitted.
Similarly, let β, 1 − β denote, respectively, the probability of choosing
(U,D), and (D,U).
Lemma 7 Let conditions (4) and (5) hold. P1 best responses are given by
(m1,m2,m1,m2) if βys <
1
2
(m2,m1,m2,m1) if βys >
1
2
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The proof is identical to the one for lemma 5 and therefore is omitted.
We are now ready to characterize the (pure strategy) Nash equilibria of
this game.
Proposition 6 Let conditions (4) and (5) hold. The pure strategies Nash
equilibria of the game are given by
EQ1 : [(m2,m1,m2,m1), (U,D)] if 12 > max{xt, yb}
EQ2 : [(m1,m2,m1,m2), (D,U)] for any parameters’ value.
Further, for the sophisticated sender, all the above equilibria imply that, with
majority rule, the outcome favorable to the sender will result, whatever the
state.
This results shows that when payoffs the probability that the sender is a
friend is higher than 1/2, the coordination on the type of messages received
depends upon the distribution of mortal types only when the sophisticated
sender chooses to behave differently from the mortal sender. Notice that,
again, the outcome using the majority rule implies the sender wins in every
state in any pure strategy equilibria.
4 Conclusion
We have analyzed a model with a sender interacting with a population of
receivers. The sender has information that is relevant for the payoffs of both
players. Receivers take a binary choice and the final outcome is determined
by majority rule. In addition, there is uncertainty (similar to Crawford [5])
about the sophistication of both sender and receivers. Our main result is
that pure strategy equilibria of the game share the property that if the
sender is sophisticated the outcome will be favorable for him whatever the
prevailing state. This result carries through also in the case when there are
states in which the interests of the sender are not at odds with those of
the receiver. Using this framework to analyze Osama bin Laden’s videotape
message to the American public on the eve of the 2004 U.S. Presidential
elections, we can raise some skepticism about the view according to which
“he pulled his nemesis over the finish line” 8.
We think that the game we propose is a parsimonious representation of
the conflicting interests between U.S. voters and OBL alongside whit a hid-
den true motivation for the message on OBL’s part. Nevertheless, a possible
8See Krauthammer [8]
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alternative (and equally interesting) description of what happened can be
devised if one believes that bin Laden’s message’s ultimate intended audi-
ence was not (or not only) the American public but, for example, (radical)
groups within the islamic communities worldwide. In that case, Farrell and
Gibbons [7] model of cheap talk with two audiences would be the natural
starting point for the analysis, which can be the object of further research
on the matter.
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